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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a low income individual who has been pre-
scribed a generic medication after a visit to your doctor. The medication
has an adverse side effect of which you were not warned about, causing
you discomfort and possibly forcing you to take unpaid sick days and
sacrifice income. You are angry and feel that the pharmaceutical com-
pany responsible for making the medication has wronged you. However,
you do not have the time or money to pursue a case against the pharma-
ceutical company. You have no incentive to bring an individual action
against the company in court. Subsequently, you learn that there are
many other individuals who are in the same position as you, and
together with these individuals you can file a class action to seek com-
pensation from the defendant pharmaceutical company without spending
a significant amount of valuable time or money. Class actions are but
one type of preclusionary device that our legal system recognizes as
valid, and are expressly permitted by our legal system's Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 While class actions have been criticized for precluding large
numbers of people from litigating their claims separately and recovering
reasonable damages, our legal system has recognized the positive eco-
nomic effect that class actions have in promoting judicial efficiency and
the legitimacy interests that class actions serve in promoting the values
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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of finality and consistency.2 The above discussion of class actions is but
one example of how our legal system reinterprets due process in con-
texts where the due process concerns raised by a preclusion device are
outweighed by the benefits that the device provides. Virtual representa-
tion, the claims preclusion doctrine which serves as the subject of this
paper, is a doctrine that seeks to promote the benefits of efficiency, con-
sistency, and finality, benefits which must be weighed against due pro-
cess concerns in order for our legal system to make a proper
determination of the scope and limit of the virtual representation doc-
trine's general applicability. Taylor v. Sturgell,3 a Supreme Court case
decided on June 12, 2008, grappled with the difficult issue of defining
the virtual representation doctrine's parameters and raised a number of
important preclusion questions in the process. At the risk of oversimpli-
fication, Sturgell addressed whether it should ever be proper for a court
to tell a party filing a lawsuit that their case is precluded,4 essentially a
declaration that the court will not hear their problems because the court
has already heard arguments on the same issues by another similarly
situated party. This raises a number of questions about when it is proper
to preclude a filing party's case under the virtual representation doctrine,
including whether preclusion is justified when that party has already
been actively involved in litigating a prior claim by using a prior party
as a proxy; whether a filing party should be precluded because of an
existing relationship with a prior party that points to some involvement
by the current party in a prior party's prior lawsuit; and whether a filing
party can be precluded, even in the absence of evidence of involvement
in a prior suit, where the filing party is using the same lawyer, argument,
and litigation strategy as the prior party. The answers to these questions
are essential in establishing the parameters of an effective claim preclu-
sion doctrine, and can only be properly answered by weighing the values
of efficiency, consistency, and finality against countervailing interests of
constitutional due process.
2. See Richard Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second Look, CIVIL JUSTICE
REPORT, May 2002, at 7-9.
3. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008).
4. Virtual representation is a claims preclusion doctrine. Claims preclusion is generally
defined by Black's Law Dictionary (under the synonymous term res judicata) as "barring the
same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from
the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been-but was not-raised in
the first suit." BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY (8th ed. 2004). Claim preclusion is to be distinguished
from issue preclusion as follows: "[T]he principal distinction between claim preclusion and issue
preclusion is... that the former forecloses litigation of matters that have never been litigated. This
makes it important to know the dimensions of the 'claim' that is foreclosed by bringing the first
action, but unfortunately no precise definition is possible." CHARLES ALAN WRHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 100A (6th ed. 2002).
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In Sturgell, the Supreme Court attempted to address the above
questions when it considered how to define a nebulous series of preclu-
sionary concepts collectively referred to as the virtual representation
doctrine. The virtual representation doctrine is a specific subset of claim
preclusion. It can be briefly defined as the principle that a currently fil-
ing party may be bound by a judgment issued in a prior action if one of
the parties to the prior action is so closely aligned with the currently
filing party's interests as to be his or her virtual representative. 5 Beyond
the requirement that there be an identity of interests and adequate repre-
sentation in the prior case,6 the requirements necessary for a court to
invoke the virtual representation doctrine have never been clearly
defined. Throughout its long legal history, the doctrine has been periodi-
cally broadened, narrowed, and rebroadened.7 Prior to the Sturgell deci-
sion, federal courts broadly interpreted the doctrine, employing a totality
of circumstances analysis to determine whether to apply the virtual rep-
resentation doctrine.8 However, in Sturgell, the Supreme Court restric-
tively redefined the virtual representation test as a bright-line test
whereby one of six categories of legal relationships between a filing
party and prior party must be met before the filing party's action can be
precluded under the virtual representation doctrine.9
The Sturgell Court's restriction of the virtual representation doc-
trine was primarily based on due process concerns. Because our legal
system views the ability to file a legal claim as a property interest, and
preclusion doctrines such as virtual representation restrict one from
exercising their ability to file suit, the Sturgell Court limited preclusion
by virtual representation to cases in which the party to be precluded
shares a predefined legal relationship with a party whose claim has
already been adjudicated. This rigid categorical approach is inferior to a
factual analysis based on flexible standards for the following reasons.
First, the Court's reliance on due process to justify its rigid approach
fails to take into consideration the competing values that would be
served by adopting a broad interpretation of the virtual representation
doctrine. The Court's interpretation of due process as an absolute value
has no firm historical or social basis and furthermore gives short shrift to
the countervailing values of efficiency, consistency, and finality. These
5. KARL OAKES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDMON § 51:239 (2008); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining virtual representation as "the principle that a
judgment may bind a person who is not a party to the litigation if one of the parties is so closely
aligned with the nonparty's interests that the nonparty has been adequately represented by the
party in court.").
6. Oakes, supra note 5.
7. A thorough history of the virtual representation doctrine is provided infra pp. 6-19.
8. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
9. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2169-2180 (2008).
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countervailing values are necessary to our legal system's practical func-
tionality and to the preservation of our system's legitimacy. Second, the
Court's rigid approach fails to consider the virtual representation doc-
trine's uncertain legal history and the difficulty that past courts have had
in articulating a clear definition for the doctrine. Because of this legal
history, a flexible definition is needed to allow courts to properly define
the boundary at which virtual representation ends and due process
begins. A rigid definition is only likely to get overturned by judicial
review as future court decisions begin scrutinizing its artificial catego-
ries, only increasing the confusion that courts face in defining virtual
representation. Finally, the Court's rigid approach glosses over the sub-
stantive weight of a party's claim, determining whether or not a party
will be granted their day in court solely by looking at whether or not the
party falls within a predefined legal category. This approach seems to
formalize due process determinations which courts have historically
treated as personal, rather than mechanical, determinations.
This paper will show that the Sturgell Court's restriction of the vir-
tual representation doctrine is a decision which ignores the practical
realities of our legal system in order to protect a perceived day-in-court
ideal which has no solid precedential or historical/traditional basis. Part
II of this paper will analyze the history of virtual representation from its
inception as a property concept all the way to its reinterpretation in the
Sturgell decision. Part III will deal with the Sturgell decision and the
specific limitations which that decision places on the virtual representa-
tion doctrine. Part IV will argue that the Supreme Court's reinterpreta-
tion of the virtual representation doctrine placed too much emphasis on
the day-in-court ideal and, consequently, ignored the practical advan-
tages that a broader interpretation of the doctrine would have provided.
Part V will argue that the Court's bright line approach to virtual repre-
sentation is less effective than a totality of the circumstances test
because, given the virtual representation doctrine's uncertain history, a
totality of the circumstances test would be more efficient than a bright-
line rule approach in allowing courts to consider the competing values of
due process and legal consistency, finality, and efficiency. Finally, Part
VI will attempt to draft an alternative totality of the circumstances test to
be used in determining when to apply the virtual representation doctrine.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE
The virtual representation doctrine has had a long legal history of
redefinition and reinterpretation. This history has been so long and vari-
able that it is difficult to define exactly how far the virtual representation
[Vol. 64:735
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doctrine actually extends.' ° Virtual representation originally started out
as a narrow property concept used to bind unknown, unascertained, or
unborn remaindermen to judgments relating to the settlement of property
estates.'1 This initial iteration of the virtual representation doctrine
applied to a restricted number of cases and had two basic justifications
for precluding the claims of third parties in those cases: (1) it was cre-
ated out of a necessity of making judgments applicable to future parties
that were presently unascertainable, 2 and (2) the parties who presently
owned an estate also usually controlled the interests of third party
remaindermen, so in effect the third parties whose rights were being
precluded had at best only tenuous claims to the property in question.1 3
The virtual representation doctrine was thus originally created as a way
to deal with the interests of unascertained remaindermen in real property
cases. and was initially justified as a no-participation doctrine"4 whose
purpose was to prevent property litigation from continuing to
perpetuity'-if one's property interest could not be determined until
there was no risk of new unascertained remaindermen claiming an inter-
est, litigation would go on ad infinitum and clear determination of own-
ership interests in these cases would be effectively impossible, leading
to a confusing social definition of property and difficult-to-manage
property markets.1 6 Originally, virtual representation was not actually
justified as a representation theory; it was not concerned with whether
an absent litigant's legal interests were or were not properly litigated by
virtue of adequate representation.1 7
By the latter half of the 19th century, estate interests such as the fee
tail and common recovery were abandoned in United States and the
rationale for justifying the virtual representation doctrine as a no-partici-
pation theory necessary to cut off unascertained remainders was no
10. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4457 (4th ed.
2009).
11. Jack L. Johnson, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual Representation as the Justification for
the Preclusion ofa Nonparty's Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1304, 1310-11 (1994).
12. Pugh v. Frierson, 221 F. 513, 524 (6th Cir. 1915); see also Johnson, supra note 11, at
1310.
13. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 207 (1992).
14. Id. at 209.
15. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1311.
16. See John K. Morris, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment: The Privity Rule
Reconsidered, 56 CAL. L. Rav. 1098, 1098-99 (1968); see also Galvin v. Curtin, 49 N.E. 523, 527
(Ill. 1898) (finding that to deny the power to determine estates via virtual representation would be
to sacrifice the fights of the present generations for the sake of posterity, the effect of which would
be to seriously hinder the advancement of property ownership in the United States).
17. Bone, supra note 13, at 209 ("[T]his form of representation had nothing to do with the
tenant in tail representing remaindermen in the sense of litigating on their behalf. It had to do ...
with the tenant in tail representing ... legal rights that attached to the estate.").
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longer valid. 8 Courts therefore had to justify using virtual representa-
tion in property cases under a new rationale. This rationale no longer
looked at whether a property owner had legal rights in an estate that
should preclude future remaindermen from bringing suit, but instead
asked whether the absent remainderman had an entitlement to participa-
tion in the litigation.' 9 The United States' abandonment of several Brit-
ish common-law estates in the 19th century therefore led to a
fundamental redefinition of the virtual representation doctrine: courts no
longer looked to the legal ownership of the estate owner, but to the enti-
tlement of the potential remainderman to participate, in order to deter-
mine whether virtual representation was proper.20 This new rationale
meant that virtual representation was no longer limited to estate cases.
Courts began applying the virtual representation doctrine to a wide vari-
ety of property cases, including disputes over trusts, 21 stock distribu-
tions,22 and taxpayer interests in government actions.23 This 19th
century shift broadened the virtual representation doctrine considerably.
The doctrine's application was no longer limited to precluding the inter-
ests of unidentified third parties with future property interests, 24 and was
expanded to preclude future claims where there was an identity of inter-
est between a prior litigating party and a present litigating party. 25 While
many of the property law vestiges of the virtual representation doctrine
have since been shed, this "identity of interest" element of virtual repre-
sentation remains a key requirement of the doctrine to this day.
During the early 20th century, our legal system underwent a prag-
matic shift whereby courts became concerned with legal procedure's
impact on fairness, efficiency, and distributional justice.2 6 Courts began
to wrestle with the challenges of overcrowded courts and the challenge
of keeping outcomes consistent and fair in a litigious society. Because
18. Id. at 209.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 210.
21. Hale v. Hale, 33 N.E. 858 (Ii. 1893).
22. Bacon v. Robertson, 59 U.S. 480 (1855).
23. Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 13 N.E. 161 (Ill. 1887).
24. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1313.
25. Id. ("Courts interpreting the old rule of virtual representation ... presumed
representational adequacy from an identity of interests. Beyond this incidental identity of interests,
the old rule of virtual representation required no legally significant relationship between the party
and nonparty."); see also Bone, supra note 13, at 211 ("Virtual representation no more required
that the litigating party actually represent class members ... [r]ather, the party 'represented' the
status-based legal rights that attached to the class qua class, and he brought those rights to the
court for its determination."); Webster v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 50 F. Supp. 11, 14 (S.D. Cal.
1943) (emphasis added) (finding that it is "not so much the representation of the persons, but the
representation of the interests, with which the law is concerned in this type of action.").
26. Bone, supra note 13, at 212.
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virtual representation had become intertwined with the concept of iden-
tity of interests during the mid 19th century, it fit nicely into the 20th
century pragmatists' view that procedural efficiency required at least
some limitation of litigation opportunities.27 Courts began to evaluate
the doctrine in terms of its impact in promoting judicial efficiency,
resulting in virtual representation's transition from a niche property
exception to a more generalized preclusion doctrine. As virtual represen-
tation became a generally accepted procedural doctrine, courts began to
seriously consider the doctrine's constitutional ramifications for the first
time.28 The benefits of judicial efficiency, cost saving, and finality
derived from the virtual representation doctrine were weighed against
the doctrine's impact on individual constitutional rights.2 9 In practice,
this new consideration of virtual representation's impact on individual
rights led to diminished use of the doctrine as courts began recognizing
that the use of virtual representation was, in many cases, a violation of
the Due Process Clause and its perceived day-in-court ideal.30 As virtual
representation became a certified procedural doctrine in the 20th cen-
tury, our legal system began the strenuous exercise of defining the
boundaries of virtual representation through the unenviable task of set-
ting the tipping point at which due process concerns outweighed our
legal system's interests in efficiency and judicial economy.
As courts began analyzing the virtual representation doctrine under
this new Constitutional microscope, the logical reader would predict that
the virtual representation must have been significantly restrained. How-
ever, our legal system's newfound concern with consolidating virtual
representation and Constitutional due process during the early 20th cen-
tury led to surprising results. Two Supreme Court cases decided in the
early 20th century actually served to broaden the applicability of the
virtual representation by allowing courts great leeway in applying the
doctrine to class actions and limiting procedural notice requirements in
federal courts.3 First, in Hansberry v. Lee,32 the Supreme Court refused
to allow the enforcement of a restrictive property covenant that, if signed
by 95% of owners in a specified area, would have forbidden the sale of
property to "people of color" within that area.33 The Court based its
decision on the fact that one landowner had previously brought suit in
Illinois Supreme Court purporting to represent all property owners to
27. Id. at 213-215.
28. Id. at 212
29. Johnson, supra note 11, at 1313-14.
30. Bone, supra note 13, at 214.
31. See Bone, supra note 13, at 214-216.
32. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
33. Id. at 37-38.
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whom the covenant applied.34 The Supreme Court held that a party's
due process rights were not violated by virtual representation preclusion
as long as that party had notice of a prior action and there was an iden-
tity of interest between the party and a party to the prior hearing.35 The
Court reasoned that as long as absent parties are adequately represented
by parties litigating a case, those absent parties may be precluded from
bringing suit without a violation of due process because their interests
have been adequately represented.36 Hansberry also recognized the need
for lenient preclusion rules in class-action suits but refused to adopt a
bright-line rule as to when preclusion by virtual representation would
apply in these cases. 37 Hansberry's "adequate representation" require-
ment set an ambiguous standard for when to apply virtual representation
without violating due process. Hansberry's recognition of the need for a
more liberal application of the doctrine in certain types of cases also
implicitly signaled that the judicial realities of overcrowded courtrooms
and legal costs were of greater concern than preserving a literal reading
of the Due Process Clause in our legal system.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v. Hano-
ver38 rejected the notion that notice was always required to be given to
unidentified parties, holding instead that, where a party was not readily
identifiable, reasonable notice was all that due process required. 39 In
Mullane, the Supreme Court held that, while a trust company had to give
notice to all beneficiaries before undergoing a judicial settlement of its
accounts as a common trustee, notice via a newspaper of general circula-
34. Id. at 42-43.
35. Id. at 40:
State courts are free to attach such descriptive labels to litigations before them as
they may choose and to attribute to them such consequences as they think
appropriate under state constitutions and laws, subject only to the requirements of
the Constitution of the United States. But when the judgment of a state court,
ascribing to the judgment of another court the binding force and effect of res
judicata, is challenged for want of due process it'becomes the duty of this Court to
examine the course of procedure in both litigations to ascertain whether the litigant
whose rights have thus been adjudicated has been afforded such notice and
opportunity to be heard as are requisite to the due process which the Constitution
prescribes.
36. Id. at 43.
37. Id. at 41-42 (The Court held that while the general rule in American jurisdictions is that
"one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process," there is a recognized
exception that "to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion, the judgment in a 'class' or
'representative' suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the
class or those represented who were not made parties to it."); see also Royal Arcanum v. Green,
237 U.S. 531, 538 (1915).
38. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39. Id. at 320.
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tion was enough to satisfy due process with respect to beneficiaries
whose whereabouts could not be ascertained with due diligence.4" Mul-
lane is especially important in the context of virtual representation
because, like Hansberry, it demonstrates that our legal system recog-
nizes the limitations of practical reality on the Due Process Clause.41
Clearly, the symbolic notice prescribed by the Mullane Court would not
have the intended effect of putting the targeted beneficiaries on notice.
By holding that general publication sufficed where the trust company
could not obtain beneficiaries' addresses, Mullane effectively held that
reasonable attempts to abide by the textual requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause were all that the clause requires.4" This was an implicit
assertion by the Supreme Court that due process is not absolute, and
must defer to judicial efficiency when protecting the interests of future
parties no longer becomes practicable. Indeed, both Mullane's and Han-
sberry's limits on due process combined to acknowledge that due pro-
cess must be weighed against judicial efficiency in the context of
preclusion. As courts began recognizing the procedural limitations of
due process, it was natural for courts to adopt a broader interpretation of
the virtual representation doctrine.
The Supreme Court's liberal interpretations of due process and
notice requirements in Mullane and Hansberry were consolidated and
integrated into the virtual representation doctrine by the 5th Circuit in
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew.4 3 The court in Aerojet was asked to
consider whether Dade County, Florida could bring forth a suit asserting
that the county had the right to purchase land currently being held by a
private corporation with an option to purchase, or whether the county's
claim was precluded because it had already been virtually represented by
a Florida state board in a previous suit." In determining that the county
was precluded from bringing suit, the court laid out a broad definition of
virtual representation. The Aerojet court stated that the question of
whether a prior party has acted as a virtual representative to a party
40. Id. at 317-320.
41. The Court in Mullane stated that adequate notice could be provided to parties not readily
ascertainable by taking out an advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation. This method of
"notice" clearly had little to no chance of reaching the unidentified parties in question but was the
only practical way to deal with the due process notice requirement in the given case. See
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 162 (2002) ("The Due Process Clause does not require
heroic efforts by the Government to assure the notice's delivery, nor does it require the
Government to substitute petitioner's proposed procedures that would have required verification
of receipt.").
42. Harvey Rochman, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. Rev. 2705,
2723-2724 (1992).
43. 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 712-15.
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bringing suit is a question of fact, to be determined by looking at the
closeness of the relationship between the prior party and party bringing
suit and by making a judgment as to whether the interests of the current
party were adequately represented by the prior party.45 While Aerojet
established a fact-based test for determining virtual representation, the
court failed to specify how its interpretation of virtual representation
meshed with the due process concerns that had been raised at the start of
the twentieth century. 46 In fact, the opinion makes no mention of the
Due Process Clause. Aerojet's broad holding, coupled with its failure to
define a plausible approach to consolidating the virtual representation
doctrine with due process requirements led to more questions than it did
answers, ushering in a period of confusion in defining the virtual repre-
sentation doctrine. 47 Federal Circuits split between narrow and broad
interpretations of the virtual representation doctrine, and two polarized
views emerged.48 On one end of the spectrum was the Fifth Circuit,
which reconsidered its liberal interpretation of the doctrine in Aerojet
and decided instead to apply a narrow interpretation of the doctrine in
Pollard v. Cockrell.49 In Cockrell, massage-parlor owners brought suit
challenging a city ordinance regulating massage parlors, and the court
was faced with the issue of whether the owners' suit should be precluded
because the same statute had already been challenged by other owners. 50
The current owners filing suit used the same lawyer as previous owners,
had identical interests, and even filed complaints that were identical,
except for their jurisdictional averments.5 Nevertheless, the Fifth Cir-
cuit refused to apply the virtual representation doctrine, stating that vir-
tual representation requires the showing of an express legal relationship
between the current party filing suit and a prior party that has already
filed suit in order for preclusion of the current party to be proper.52
While the court did not provide an exhaustive list of legal relationships
that would subject a claim to preclusion by virtual representation, the
45. Id. at 719-20.
46. Bone, supra note 13, at 220 ("Unfortunately, the court [in Aerojet] did not also provide a
theory of participation that could support its new doctrine, nor did it explain how an interest
representation rationale could possibly satisfy an absentee's right to a personal day in court.").
47. Professor Bone notes that later cases interpreting Aerojet's broad redefinition of virtual
representation were "ad hoc" in nature and lacked a "clear organizing framework." Bone, supra
note 13, at 220. See also Colby v. J.C. Penny Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that, where J.C. Penny raised a virtual representation defense, the plaintiff's suit would be barred
as long as there had been an adequate representation of the plaintiff's interest, but there is no
uniform case law defining the parameters of adequate representation).
48. Id. at 223.
49. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 1005.




court gave the following examples: (1) estate beneficiaries bound by
administrators of the estate, (2) presidents/sole stockholders and the
companies they own, (3) parent corporations and their subsidiaries (4)
trust beneficiaries and trustees, and (5) government authority that is the
public enforcer of an ordinance or statute and private parties suing for
enforcement as private attorneys general under the statute.53 The Fifth
Circuit's requirement of a preexisting legal relationship 4 essentially
eliminated the applicability of any substantive analysis. Indeed, given
the parties' use of the same lawyer and litigation in Pollard, the outcome
would have been entirely different had the court adopted a broad inter-
pretation of virtual representation. On the other end of the spectrum, the
Eighth Circuit, in Tyus v. Schoemel,55 adopted a much more liberal inter-
pretation of the virtual representation doctrine, requiring only the exis-
tence of a "special relationship" between a current party and a party to a
prior action in order for virtual representation to apply.56 In Tyus, the
court was asked to decide whether a suit by African American voters
alleging that the city of Saint Louis had engaged in gerrymandering after
the 1990 census precluded a subsequent suit by the city's aldermen chal-
lenging the same boundary redrawing. 57 The court considered and
expressly rejected Pollard's limited definition of virtual representation,
noting that a broad application of virtual representation allows for a
more precise balancing of due process against judicial economy.58
Unlike Pollard's rigid categorical approach, Tyus adopted a fact-inten-
sive totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether the pre-
sent party has already been adequately represented by a prior party.59
The factors which the court considered dispositive in identifying a spe-
cial relationship under Tyus were: (1) identity of interests, (2) a close
relationship in fact, (3) participation in the prior litigation, (4) apparent
acquiescence, (5) deliberate maneuvering to avoid the effects of the first
action, (6) the incentive of the prior party to seek protections of interests
which are important to the first party, and (7) whether the claims raise a
53. Id. at 1008-1009.
54. Id. at 1008.
55. Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996).
56. The underlying problem with the "special relationship" approach adopted by the Eighth
Circuit is that courts have often struggle to define when the relationship between two parties is
"sufficiently close" to justify preclusion. See Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 750 F.2d 603,
607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a current party may be precluded based on a relationship
that is "sufficiently close" to that of a prior party, but that there is no bright line rule for making
this determination).
57. Tyus, 93 F.3d at 451-53.
58. Id. at 454-55.
59. Id. at 455-56 ("Due to the equitable and fact-intensive nature of virtual representation,
there is no clear test for determining the applicability of the doctrine. There are, however, several
guiding principles.").
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public law or private law issue.6 ° The Eighth Circuit's totality of the
circumstances approach is a marked departure from the Fifth Circuit's
legal-relationship test because it looks at the substantive weight that
each claim presents rather than using predefined categories to decide
cases on an inflexible basis. In fact, the Pollard court would very likely
have reached an opposite decision under this substantive test. This split
between the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit definitions of virtual repre-
sentation speaks to the difficulty that courts have had in consolidating
the practical utility of the virtual representation doctrine with the due
process concerns that broad application of the doctrine inevitably raises.
Faced with two polarized definitions of the virtual representation
doctrine at the Circuit level, the Supreme Court tackled the problem of
defining virtual representation in Richards v. Jefferson County.6' Rich-
ards involved a suit by Birmingham, Alabama, county taxpayers who
challenged the city's occupational tax. The issue centered on whether
these parties should be precluded from bringing suit where Birming-
ham's finance director had already challenged the occupation tax in a
previous suit.62 The Court adopted a broad definition of virtual represen-
tation that required only adequate representation between a present and
prior party in order for preclusion to be proper. In the Court's eyes,
adequate representation was met when there was privity between the
present and prior party; privity, in turn, was said to cover "various rela-
tionships between litigants that would not have come within the tradi-
tional definition of that term."'63 The Richards Court used Hansberry to
further broaden the applicability of virtual representation by stating that
the Hansberry opinion "may be read to leave open the possibility that in
some class suits adequate representation might cure a lack of notice." 64
Having used Hansberry to dispense of notice concerns, all the Court
required to justify the applicability of virtual representation to a current
action was that the prior action would have been "so devised and applied
as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent and
that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair considera-
tion of the common issue. 65 While the Richards Court ultimately
refused to conclude that the county taxpayers were adequately repre-
sented by the finance director, the Court's application of the adequate-
representation standard is effectively an endorsement of the esoteric def-
60. Id. at 455-57; see also 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4457 (4th ed. 2009).
61. 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
62. Id. at 793-94.
63. Id. at 798.




inition adopted by the Eighth Circuit. The Court did not look to see if
there was a preexisting legal relationship between parties. Instead, it
focused on whether the finance director represented the pecuniary inter-
ests of county taxpayers rather than the corporate interests of the city
itself.66 The Court concluded that the record and the pleadings evinced
that the finance director did not have the taxpayers' interest in mind and
adequate representation was therefore lacking where the finance director
and the county taxpayers were at best "'strangers' to one another. '6 7 By
engaging in a substantive analysis of whether adequate representation
has been met, the Richards decision gave courts broad discretion in
applying the virtual representation doctrine.68 Richards therefore
impliedly rejected the notion that virtual representation should be deter-
mined by looking to predetermined legal classes.
The broad definition of virtual representation propounded by the
Court in Richards has been significantly narrowed in Taylor v. Sturgell,
a decision which replaces Richards substantive virtual representation
test with an approach that requires the existence of a defined legal rela-
tionship between the current party and a party to a prior action before
preclusion by virtual representation is proper, 69 an approach that is
closely analogous to the Fifth Circuit's approach in Pollard.
III. THE TA YLOR V. STURGELL DECISION
The Sturgell decision adopted a narrow interpretation of the virtual
representation doctrine, requiring a legal relationship between a party
and nonparty to a suit before the virtual representation doctrine is appli-
cable. The Supreme Court justified its narrow interpretation of the doc-
trine on the grounds that it is necessary to preserve the due process day-
in-court ideal at the expense of the benefits that a broader interpretation
of the virtual representation doctrine could provide.
The facts in Sturgell are outlined below; they are important for the
purposes of this paper because they give the reader a better sense of the
artificially narrow results that the Court's definition of virtual represen-
tation may produce. Sturgell's story starts with an antique airplane. The
owner of that airplane was Greg Herrick, an aircraft mechanic and
66. Id. at 801-02.
67. Id. at 802.
68. Laura Evans, Limiting Virtual Representation in Headwaters Inc. v. United States Forest
Service: Lost (Opportunity) in the Oregon Woods?, 33 EcOLoGY L.Q. 725, 733 (2006) (Richards
"indicate[s] that, in the case of public actions with indirect impact on personal interests, it would
allow states broad discretion in determining what judicial proceedings to apply, and even whether
to grant standing in the first place").
69. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2169-2180 (2008).
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enthusiast.70 He was also a member of the Antique Aircraft Association
(AAA). Herrick owned an F-45 airplane manufactured by the Fairchild
Engine and Airplane Corporation (FEAC) in the 1930s.71 In 1997, Her-
rick became interested in obtaining technical data on his F-45 to com-
plete restoration of the airplane. He filed a Freedom of Information Act
-(FOIA) request asking the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for
copies of the necessary documents (the FAA had copies of these docu-
ments because it keeps certifications of all airplanes authorized for
sale)., 2 The FAA denied Herrick's request.7 3 Herrick filed suit in Wyo-
ming against the FAA, and the FAA invoked a trade secrets defense,
prompting the District Court to grant summary judgment in the FAA's
favor in 2000.74 Herrick appealed and, on July 24, 2002, the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, also relying on
the trade secret doctrine. On August 22, 2002, Brent Taylor submitted
an FOIA request for the same documents Herrick had just unsuccess-
fully sued to obtain. 76 Taylor was a friend of Herrick's, and was also a
member of the Antique Aircraft Association.77 The FAA failed to
respond to Taylor's request in a timely manner and Taylor sued in the
U.S. District Court of Columbia using the same lawyer that Herrick
used.78 The District Court concluded that Taylor's suit was barred by the
virtual representation doctrine, applying a seven factor totality of the
circumstances test that looked at: (1) the identity of interest between the
parties; (2) the presence of a close relationship between the parties; (3)
participation of the present party in the prior party's litigation; (4) the
present party's acquiescence to preclusive effects of a prior judgment;
(5) the present party's deliberate maneuvering to avoid the applicability
of a prior judgment to the presently filed action; (6) adequate representa-
tion of the present party in the prior party's action; and (7) whether the
suit raises a public, rather than private, law issue.79 Using this test, the
Court found that Taylor had been virtually represented in Herrick's prior
action and Taylor's case should therefore be precluded.80 In coming to
this decision, the court placed special importance on the following facts:
Taylor was the president of the AAA, an organization of which Herrick
70. Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002).
71. Id, at 1188.
72. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2163 (2008).
73. Id. at 968.
74. Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
75. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2161 (2008); Blakely, 490 F.3d at 965.
76. Blakely, 490 F.3d at 969.
77. Id. at 968-69.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 971.
80. Id. at 978.
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was also a member; Herrick had asked Taylor for help in restoring the F-
45 prior to Taylor filing suit; Taylor was represented by the same lawyer
that represented Herrick in the prior suit; and finally, Taylor used a num-
ber of documents that Herrick had obtained from the FAA and had used
in his suit."1
Taylor appealed, and the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the District
Court's decision but rejected the District Court's seven factor test in
favor of its own "five factor test," which is really a hybrid three factor
test.82 The D.C. Circuit's test also employed a totality of the circum-
stances test, looking at whether there was (1) identity of interest, (2)
adequate representation in the prior action, and (3) at least one of the
following three factors: (A) a close relationship between the current
party and a party to the prior action; (B) Substantial participation by the
present party in the prior action; (C) tactical maneuvering by the current
party to avoid applicability of a prior judgment to their case. 3 The D.C.
Circuit's test goes one step further than the District of Columbia's test in
that it requires at least one of elements (A)-(C), all of which involve a
party's knowing participation in the prior suit.84 Elements (A)-(C) could
therefore be said to meet the due process notice requirement because a
party who does any of the acts in (A)-(C) must have had notice of the
prior action and, furthermore, must have been directly involved in the
prior action as well.8 The D.C. Circuit concluded that, under its seven
factor test, Taylor had already been virtually represented by Herrick. 6
The Court reasoned that Taylor and Herrick had identical interests in
seeking the airplane data, Taylor and Herrick were close associates who
were members of the same organization, and Herrick had adequately
represented Taylor in the prior suit where Herrick had used the same
lawyer and litigation strategy.87
The Supreme Court rejected both of the aforementioned totality of
the circumstances tests in favor of an even more stringent test that
81. Id. at 969.
82. Id. at 971-72.
83. Id. at 971-73.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 974:
The district court concluded Taylor apparently had notice of Herrick's litigation
based primarily upon their shared interest in antique aircraft, their common
membership in the AAA, their use of the same lawyer for their respective cases,
Herrick's sharing with Taylor the information he obtained through discovery, and
his request that Taylor assist in the restoration of his F-45. As Taylor and the amicus
note, however, these facts do not show that Taylor had notice of Herrick's lawsuit
while it was ongoing. We turn to other indicia, therefore, to determine whether
Taylor was adequately represented by Herrick.
86. Id. at 978.
87. Id.
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requires a showing of one of the following six legal relationships
between a current party and a party to a prior action before virtual repre-
sentation can be used to preclude the current party's claim: (1) the cur-
rent party expressly agrees to be bound by the judgment of a prior
action; (2) a preexisting substantive legal relationships between the cur-
rent party and a party to a prior action (ex. assignor-assignee, bailor-
bailee); (3) the current party was already adequately represented by a
party to a prior action that was a member of the same representative
class as the current party or that has a fiduciary relationship with the
current party (ex. trustor-trustee, guardian-dependent); (4) the current
party assumed control over the litigation of the prior action; (5) the cur-
rent party uses the party to a prior action as a proxy to litigation; or (6) a
statutory scheme expressly forecloses successive litigation by the current
party.88 Each of the above six categories requires a defined preexisting
legal relationship between the current party and a prior party, effectively
replacing the virtual representation's "identity of interests" and "ade-
quate representation" requirements with a "prior legal relationship"
requirement. The Supreme Court based its decision to restrict the virtual
representation doctrine on two grounds. First, the Court opined that ade-
quate representation is only present when there are special procedures to
protect nonparties' interests or there is an understanding by the con-
cerned parties that the first suit was brought in a representative capac-
ity.8 9 The Court's view is that, in order for a party's interests to be
protected, preclusion cannot be based on anything less than a defined
legal relationship between a current party and a prior party if the day-in-
court ideal is to be upheld.9" Second, the Court's narrow redefinition of
the virtual representation doctrine was based on the Court's concern
over the inconsistent application of totality of the circumstances tests by
lower courts; the Court's fear is that such a test would result in different
definitions and tests for determining when virtual representation
applies.9" In short, the Supreme Court's holding in Sturgell is an attempt
to create a clear, bright-line approach to the virtual representation doc-
trine.92 However, the Court has perhaps been too hasty in narrowing the
scope of the doctrine without considering the potential benefits that a
broader totality of the circumstances approach has to offer. As explained
88. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2169-2180 (2008).
89. Id. at 1774.
90. Id. at 1771.
91. Id. at 1776; there is certainly some justification for this concern as evinced by the historic
split in interpretation between the 5th and 8th Circuits, see supra pp. 14-17; however I would
argue that it is precisely because of the virtual representation doctrine's historically elusive
definition that a totality of the circumstances test would be a better fit for the doctrine than a
bright line rule, see infra pp. 43-46.
92. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. at 2176-77.
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below, there is a strong argument to be made that these benefits out-
weigh the concerns of due process and applicability on which the
Supreme Court based its decision.
IV. THE STURGELL DECISION NEEDLESSLY LIMITS THE VIRTUAL
REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE BECAUSE OF DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS
A. The Sturgell Decision Fails to Properly Account for
Countervailing Values of Efficiency, Consistency, and
Finality in its Due Process Analysis
The Due Process Clause, and the day-in-court ideal93 which the
clause embodies, were the first of two factors influencing the Supreme
Court's decision in Sturgell. However, in limiting the virtual representa-
tion doctrine to address due process concerns, the Supreme Court has
chosen to ignore the countervailing benefits of judicial efficiency, final-
ity, and consistency. As discussed below, these countervailing interests
would have been protected by a broader interpretation of the virtual rep-
resentation doctrine. Instead, these values have been sacrificed, and the
political realities of our modern judicial system have been largely
ignored, at the expense of preserving due process concerns based on
shaky legal precedent.
The first issue with the Sturgell decision is that the Supreme Court
overstates legal precedent when it quotes Richards as requiring a legal
relationship between parties in order for a current party to have been
adequately represented by a party to a prior action. The Supreme Court
quotes Richards for the principal that a nonparty may be bound by a
judgment when there has been an adequate representation of a nonparty
by a party to the case,9 4 essentially interpreting the concept of adequate
representation as being a synonym for an identifiable legal relationship
between two parties.95 The Court's interpretation harkens back to a pre-
Hansberry interpretation of the virtual representation doctrine, one
where the doctrine was strictly limited in application to specified groups
of people sharing legal relationships.96 In this case, the D.C. Circuit's
93. The legal justification for a day in court ideal is discussed infra pp. 26-28; the day in
court ideal can be broadly expressed as the notion that each person should have access to a legal
system that allows them to tell their own story, the implicit assumption being that "each story is
unique to that individual and, therefore, one that only she can tell," Leah Bressack, Small Claim
Mass Fraud Actions: A Proposal for Aggregate Litigation Under RICO, 61 VAlD. L. REv. 579
(2008).
94. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. at 2168.
95. Id. at 2165 (the Court claims that Richards "delineatefs] discrete, limited exceptions to the
fundamental rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party.").
96. See supra pp. 6-9.
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interpretation of Richards in Taylor v. Blakely is more accurate than the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Richards in Taylor v. Sturgell; the
D.C. Circuit acknowledged that "[a]t one time courts tended not to find
two parties in privity absent a specific legal relationship between [liti-
gants],"97 but clarified that the term is now "'used to describe various
relationships between litigants that would not have come within the
traditional definition of that term."' 98 The D.C. Circuit rejects the histor-
ical legal-relationship requirement and instead adopts an interpretation
that is more in line with the post-Hansberry test of asking whether the
"litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of
the common issue." 99 By narrowly interpreting the definition of "ade-
quate representation" to only include cases in which the current party
and party to a prior action stand in predefined legal relationships, the
Supreme Court has effectively ignored the Richardson definition of ade-
quate representation, which required courts to look at the substantive
aspect of the prior representation rather than limiting the definition of
"adequate representation" to a few predefined categories.100 The
Supreme Court's replacement of a fairness test with a bright-line cate-
gorical approach is a shift that is not supported by Richards.
The Supreme Court justifies this narrowing of the virtual represen-
tation doctrine by arguing that the Due Process Clause requires that
every potential litigant be given his day in court. This argument, though
noble, has no solid precedential basis in the judicial history of the United
States. The day-in-court argument can be logically broken down into
four steps:10 1 (1) the argument starts out with the assumption that a legal
cause of action is a property right;0 2 (2) the Constitution protects an
individual from having their property taken away by either the federal or
state governments; 1 3 (3) the goal of due process is to prevent the depri-
vation of one's property rights unless the depravation is fundamentally
fair; (4) a person's right to file a lawsuit therefore cannot be denied by a
state or federal court without leading to a due process violation because
a piece of the individual's property has unjustly been taken away by the
government.'0 4 This argument appears, at first blush, to be logically
97. Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
98. Id. (quoting Richards v. Jefferson, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996).
99. Id. at 970; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
100. See Richards, 490 F.3d at 801-02; Evans, supra note 68, at 733.
101. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Due Process in the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. Rev.
1044 (1984).
102. Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 341, 353-354 (3d Cir. 1986).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
104. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) ('The Due Process Clause requires that
every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit of the general law, a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry,
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sound; it is also immediately attractive because it evokes elements of
fairness and promotes the idea of complete inclusion into the judicial
processes that profoundly affect members of contemporary society. Due
process has long been recognized as a legitimate principle throughout
our legal system's history, perhaps to allay fears that government will
become too tyrannical if allowed to affect our rights and take our prop-
erty without having to justify itself. This view is clearly expressed in
Goldberg v. Kelly:' °5
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our juris-
prudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must
be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show
that it is untrue. 106
There are many academics who would argue that all legal doctrines
employed by our courts should first and foremost abide by the Constitu-
tion, and that "it is of the utmost importance to ground interpretation
explicitly in constitutional values."'' 7 Clearly, there is good reason to
protect due process. However, there are also weaknesses to the due pro-
cess argument employed by the Supreme Court in this case, as well as
countervailing interests that the Court has sacrificed in order to protect
due process against the perceived threat of virtual representation.
Finally, the day-in-court argument also fails to take the practical realities
of our present legal system into account.
First, there is no definite historical precedent supporting the claim
that due process requires that every person have their day in court. The
idea that the American judicial system has always placed litigants' right
to have their case heard in a courtroom above other judicial concerns,
while noble, is simply not true. If the day-in-court ideal truly had a
strong precedential basis in our judicial history, "the value of principled
consistency over time or respect for experience as a guide to sound insti-
tutional design might offer powerful support for a prima facie right to
participate."' 8 No such prima facie participation right has emerged dur-
ing the two hundred and twenty years that our judicial system has been
in existence. On the contrary, there are a number of cases which limit
the day-in-court ideal, and these cases are simply too numerous to be
and renders judgment only after trial, so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society").
105. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
106. Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)).
107. Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1700 (1988).
108. Bone, supra note 13, at 233.
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considered flukes or mistakes." 9 An argument in support of the day-in-
court ideal cannot be supported by arguing that the ideal is one which
has been historically recognized in our society; on the contrary, history
shows us that our judicial system has been willing to make exceptions to
the day-in-court ideal, indicating that our society's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause is fluid enough to recognize that there are values
which our system holds in a higher regard than the idea that every liti-
gant should have their case heard. Nowhere is our judicial system's lib-
eral understanding of the Due Process Clause more apparent than in the
history of the virtual representation doctrine, a history which consists of
a cyclical process of expanding and limiting the virtual representation
doctrine with the hope of balancing due process concerns with the con-
cerns of judicial efficiency, finality, and consistency."o
Contrary to the Supreme Court's claim in Sturgell, there is also no
definable traditional justification for the day-in-court ideal. The
Supreme Court justifies its limitation of the virtual representation doc-
trine on the grounds that "[t]he application of claim and issue preclusion
to nonparties thus runs up against the 'deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.""" But there is no tradi-
tional requirement in our judicial system that every person who feels
wronged or unjustly treated by our judicial system may have their com-
plaints heard by a legal tribunal. "2 It would be impractical for our legal
system to apply the Due Process Clause so adamantly as to allow anyone
who wishes to challenge an action taken by our legal system to do so.
Furthermore, the conceit that our government is so in tune with individ-
ual rights as to give everyone a just hearing before depriving them of
rights is simply invalid." 3 For example, there are government limita-
109. Id.; the limitations of due process have been recognized as early as the 1880s by
American courts, see Lavin v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 1 F. 641, 660 (1880) (quoting Murray
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 280 (1855)):
For, though 'due process of law; generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex,
regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled
course of judicial proceedings, yet this is not universally true. There may be, and we
have seen that there are, cases under the law of England after Magna Charta, and as
it was brought to this country and acted on here, in which process, in its nature final,
issues against the body, lands and goods of certain public creditors without any such
trial'.
110. For a discussion of this history, see supra pp. 6-19.
111. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson, 517 U.S.
793, 798 (1996)).
112. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding
that applying due process to administrative claims affecting the entire public is impractical and not
constitutionally required).
113. In Mullane, Justice Jackson astutely noted that "[a] construction of the Due Process
Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified."
Mullane v. Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 313-314 (1950).
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tions such as driving or drinking age which are imposed upon our soci-
ety by the government and which we cannot challenge in court. We
recognize our government's sovereignty, and in recognizing that sover-
eignty there is an implicit understanding that our government can limit
our legal and property rights for the purpose of maintaining social order.
The takings clause, for example, allows the government to take property
with just compensation."I4 This in and of itself is a limit on our property
rights because our property can be taken from us as long as fair value is
paid, regardless of whether we did not want to trade our property for
money. Another example of government limitation of property rights is
the rejection of the English usque ad coelum principle in favor of gov-
ernment ownership of airspace above private property in order to ensure
the possibility of efficient air travel." 5 Our legal system also employs
justiciability doctrines to limit potential litigants' access to courts. Tax-
payer standing, for example, limits a person's right to challenge the gov-
ernment's spending of his tax money, limiting access to courts in favor
of government efficiency. 16 Mootness also limits a potential litigants'
ability to have a claim heard. 1" 7 Clearly, government has traditionally
been allowed to confiscate private property rights and limit legal rights
to maintain social order, and virtual representation is merely an exten-
sion of that same concept. Under the Supreme Court's reasoning that the
ability to file a lawsuit is a property right, limiting citizens' access to the
judicial system is just another limitation which we implicitly agree to in
recognizing our government's sovereignty. Because government can
take away individual property rights for the sake of preserving social
order and efficiency,' 18 the virtual representation doctrine should be
viewed as an inherently accepted government limitation on property
rights. The history of the virtual representation doctrine has seen numer-
114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that property owners do not have cognizable property rights to the public airspace above their land
for purposes of the 5th amendment).
116. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
117. There is an argument to be made for the deconstitutionalization of mootness as justified
by the "cases or controversies" language in the Constitution. See Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 603, 654-669
(1992),.If mootness were to be stripped of this Constitutional justification, it would be nothing
more than a government imposed screening device designed to prevent plaintiffs from access to
courts in order to clear docket space. Id. Such an interpretation of mootness should theoretically
prompt the Supreme Court to raise the same due process concerns with mootness that they decided
to employ against the virtual representation doctrine in Sturgell.
118. Eminent domain, for example, is essentially "the use of government power to maintain
and preserve political, economic and social order in society and life." Donald C. Guy, The Climax
of Takings Jurisprudence in the Rehnquist Court Era: Looking Back from Kelo, Chevron U.S.A.
and San Remo Hotel at Standards of Review for Social and Economic Regulation, 16 PENN. ST.
ENvTL. L. REV. 115, 180-181 (2007).
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ous judicial policies that liberally construe the Due Process Clause, lim-
iting the day-in-court ideal for the sake of efficiency. Because our legal
system is implicitly empowered to limit private property rights in order
to promote values such as efficiency, finality, and consistency, no argu-
ment can be made that there is a traditional basis by which the day-in-
court ideal can be justified. In fact, one could go so far and argue that an
overly stringent application of due process actually serves to decrease
the equal treatment of individual claimants in our legal system:
[T]here is a conflict between the ideal of doing justice in the individ-
ual case and the equally fundamental ideal of fairness as equality of
treatment. The more judges and juries are permitted to pursue the
varying details of each claim and claimant, the more they will gener-
ate uneven outcomes across cases and parties. This conflict between
individualization and equality is more frequently finessed by artful
categorization than confronted,119
Thus, there is no traditional or moral basis present in our legal system
which requires that every potential claimant must have their case heard
by a court or legal tribunal.
The day-in-court ideal cited by the Court also fails to take into
account the modem realities of overcrowded court dockets, which are
often so full that people must wait years to have their day in court. 2 °
Overcrowded courts justify the use of preclusion doctrines such as vir-
tual representation because these doctrines help clear up much needed
docket space for new cases to be heard.' 2' Because new cases are filed
every day, there is an endless stream of cases that courts could poten-
tially have on their dockets. Under such a model, precluding a case from
being heard merely allows another case to be put on the docket which
may not otherwise have had a chance of being heard. 122 In fact, I would
argue that overcrowded dockets necessarily require some type of preclu-
sion mechanism in order to more efficiently decide which cases will and
will not be heard. Under the modem realities of our legal system, the
119. Glen Robinson and Kenneth Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv.
1481, 1513 (1992).
120. Shaun M. Gehan, With Malice Towards One: Malice and the Substantive Law in "Class
of One" Equal Protection Claims in the Wake of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 54 ME. L.
REV. 329, 334 (2002); see also Jeremy Kennedy, The Supreme Court Swallows a Legal Fly:
Consequences for Employees as the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act Expands, 33 TEX. TECH
L. REv. 1137, 1157 (2002); Estate of Baumgardner v. CIR., 85 T.C. 445 (1985) ("Considering
the overcrowded dockets in most Federal courts, we cannot be insensitive to opportunities to avoid
unnecessary litigation").
121. See Interview, Philip Sellinger, Improved Court Funding and Enhanced Judicial
Compensation Needed, THE MFTROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, April 2008, at 19 (discussing
the effect of overcrowded dockets on class actions and the limits on issue discovery that
overcrowding places on complex cases).
122. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
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question is not whether we should or should not preclude people from
having access to courts; someone will inevitably be precluded from hav-
ing their case heard (this will occur either because a party will have their
case thrown out because of a preclusion doctrine such as virtual repre-
sentation or because a party does not get a chance to have their case
heard because of the overcrowded nature of the system). The question
inevitably becomes: how we should decide who deserves to have their
case heard more than the next person in line? Such questions can be best
answered by looking at the substantive merits of each case and deter-
mining which cases have already been substantively decided before
given the close relationship of the current party and a party to a prior
action. Given the practical realities of our judicial system, we must
acknowledge that courts simply cannot hear all of the cases that are
brought before them on a daily basis.1 23 Once one accepts this reality,
preclusion doctrines such as virtual representation become not only jus-
tified but necessary. Preventing relitigation of the same issues "con-
serves scarce judicial resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of
the public at large," which is important because "judicial resources are
finite and the number of cases that can be heard [are] limited." 124 Unfor-
tunately, Sturgell's limitation of the virtual representation doctrine
impedes the doctrine's ability to discern between cases that should and
should not be preempted. The Sturgell Court's narrowing of the doctrine
limits courts' decisionmaking power by making them focus on
predefined narrow categories of legal relationships instead of allowing
courts to base their decisions on which cases to preclude on substantive
merit. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 2 5 the Supreme Court noted that there are
a number of factors courts must look at to determine whether or not
preclusion violates due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.' 26
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the virtual representation
123. See Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The Application of State
Law to Compact Class Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 163, 204-05 (2005) (arguing that when
deciding whether federal courts have jurisdiction over a case, efficiency concerns must be
weighed and "adding to the backlog should always be closely scrutinized to ensure that the
proposed action is necessary.").
124. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CILR PROCEDURE § 16.2 at 653 (9th ed. 2008).
125. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
126. Id. at 334-35.
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doctrine effectively abandons Eldridge's complex analysis, an analysis
required to ensure that preclusion meets due process requirements in a
given case. The Supreme Court replaces this pivotal determination with
a bright-line approach consisting of six arbitrarily predetermined catego-
ries of legal relationships.
This narrowing of virtual representation's reach eliminates many of
the values that the more expansive interpretation of the doctrine pro-
vided, namely those of judicial efficiency, finality, and consistency.
Arguably, these values are of more practical importance in our present
judicial system than the abstract day-in-court ideal with which the Court
appears so enamored. 2 7
First, the Sturgell Court's definition of virtual representation fails
to account for the judicial efficiency which a broader interpretation of
the virtual representation doctrine would have provided. A broad inter-
pretation of virtual representation promotes greater judicial efficiency
because it allows our judicial system to preclude a broader range of
cases it would otherwise have had to expend considerable resources in
deciding. 128 It is true that judicial efficiency alone is not enough to over-
come the value that our legal system places on due process; courts have
consistently recognized that the Due Process Clause stands for values
higher than speed and efficiency. 29 However, efficiency is one of the
advantages to consider when balancing the pros and cons of a broad
application of the virtual representation doctrine, especially given the
practical realities of our legal system. Once courts recognize that they
are limited both in the number of cases that they can hear a day and in
the number of claims that they can hear as part of any given case, they
may come to favor a broader interpretation of the virtual representation
127. One of the age old conflicts of our legal system has been to resolve the tension between
doing what is realistically efficient and doing what is pragmatically and morally correct; the
practice of law has continually strived to operate effectively while upholding social desirable
"rights"; see Robert Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the the
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REv. 213, 228 (1990) ("The incompleteness of
the system and the existence of internal inconsistencies, for example, required that courts in
particular cases apply fairness, justice, and efficiency values directly to the social circumstances of
the case unmediated by the language and logic of rights. Sometimes this more pragmatic approach
called for results difficult to reconcile with the normative structure of the fights-based view. In
those cases, the demands of ideology set outer limits on how much deviation courts would
tolerate. But within those limits, courts struggled to accommodate the aberrant results by straining
the conceptual system to justify them, in the process often introducing new normative conflicts
and exacerbating existing ones.").
128. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the
Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 643 (2000).
129. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 583 (1974) ("the Due Process Clause 'recognizes




doctrine and the efficiency benefits such an interpretation would
provide:
Even with greater use of the class action, appointment of lead coun-
sel, active judicial management of discovery and judicial facilitation
(some would say compulsion) of settlement, there are limits to how
many parties and claims a court can handle in one litigating unit...
Nonparty preclusion holds out the hope of achieving efficiency with-
out expanding lawsuit size, and thus it should look increasingly
attractive as courts confront cases where aggregation is not cost-
justified. 130
Efficiency is a very real benefit whose value is recognized by our legal
system. The very first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
encapsulates this value, stating that the Federal Rules should be "con-
strued and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.""13 The use of the words
"speedy" and "inexpensive" in the first rule indicates that the value of
judicial efficiency is a value that should not be easily overlooked or
written off. Granted, the efficiency argument does not carry nearly as
much weight as the Due Process Clause's value of increased public par-
ticipation in our legal system. However, preclusion and due process are
not necessarily polar opposites; it is important to note that preclusion
doctrines have in some ways increased citizens' participation in the legal
system through their promotion of the "class" form:
Preclusion helps secure the class action form, and that form promotes
participation. Class cases produce more-not less-participation
because they tend to provide compensation for injuries and harms
that would otherwise be too minor to litigate. The small claims class
action is specifically justified on this ground: Absent the class form,
there would be no litigation at all because each class member's claim
is so small that the costs of pursuing it individually outweigh any
benefit she would reap. Only because of representative litigation does
this person get to participate... Thus, although there is less personal
participation in a class suit, a greater quantity of claims is resolved
with a greater number of individuals likely to receive relief, and
greater deterrence is achieved. Moreover, the extent to which individ-
uals are interested in participating in cases involving small claims, in
particular, is minimal. 1
32
The result is that preclusion doctrines such as virtual representation can
function as somewhat of a two-edged sword. One must take into account
the state of the judicial systems in which these doctrines operate in order
130. Bone, supra note 13, at 198.
131. FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
132. William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 836 (2007).
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to determine whether their effect is to prevent the participation of liti-
gants who would otherwise have had their day in court or whether the
doctrines serve to efficiently filter out cases that deserve to be heard in
full by our legal system from those that do not. "Participation, like final-
ity, is likely best produced by a rule structure that can pinpoint the value
more specifically than by an either/or solution."1 33 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court in Sturgell chose the aforementioned either/or solution in
applying a bright line test for determining when preclusion under the
virtual representation is proper.
A narrow interpretation of the virtual representation doctrine also
undermines the value of legal consistency. Without consistency, our
legal system loses legitimacy. If multiple parties try the same issue in
substantially the same manner and a court comes to two different con-
clusions on substantially the same issue, consistency is undermined and
people will begin losing faith in the legal system. "Consistency is a
prime value in a legal system ... standards of conduct should be stable
over time, as security for those who have relied on them."'' 34 By substan-
tially limiting the applicability of the virtual representation doctrine,
Sturgell threatens to undermine judicial consistency. The Court's narrow
interpretation of the doctrine will allow parties who have had adequate
representation that rises to the level posited in Richards but falls short of
the "legal relationship" requirements of Sturgell to escape preclusion.
The result is that these parties will be able to bring a claim that is the
same or substantially similar to a prior party's claim before a court and
have that claim litigated. Imagine two parties who raise the same claim
and receive substantially similar representation, but do not share a for-
mal legal relationship; the second party's case is not precluded after the
court has already granted judgment on the first party's case; the court
ends up ruling one way on the first party's case and then ruling another
way on a second party's case. In such a scenario, the same court has
given two different results in two circumstances that are substantially the
same. There is clearly something wrong with a system that produces
completely different outcomes in this situation; the validity of our judi-
cial system will naturally be questioned when similar fact patterns yield
different results.' 35 The virtual representation doctrine ensures greater
133. Id. at 837.
134. Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expectation that Public Officials Will Act Consistently,
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 549, 556 (1998) (quoting ALFRED AMAN & WILLIAM MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 14.2 (1993)).
135. Michael S. Green, Legal Realism, Lex Fori, and the Choice-of-Law Revolution, 104
Y.L.J. 967, 976 n.40 (1995) ("The utilitarian values of judicial consistency and deference to
statute are obvious: fulfillment of others' expectations, maintenance of the public order and the




judicial consistency so that society will place more weight on judicial
decisions.' 36 As an example, the importance of judicial consistency is
most evident in our criminal system, where our legal system is willing to
let a suspect who has committed a crime to a legal certainty walk
because procedural safeguards have not been followed. Evidence that
has been illegally seized 137 or that has been divulged to the police by a
suspect in violation of Miranda138 is inadmissible in court; its inadmissi-
bility may very well decide the outcome of the case as a whole, but our
system approves of these outcomes. The rationale for these oft-contro-
versial decisions is that our legal system must uphold values of legal
consistency.1 39 By requiring strict adherence to procedural safeguards
such as Miranda, our legal system ensures that justice is consistently
dispensed and outcomes of cases can be better predicted in the future.
Consistency has also been embodied in the Constitutional principles of
double jeopardy and the prohibition of ex post facto laws.14 ° The double
jeopardy principle's requirement is especially relevant here. Like virtual
representation, double jeopardy seeks to guarantee that courts will not
come out differently when trying the same issue twice. In many ways,
virtual representation is an extension of the double jeopardy doctrine,
only it goes one step further in ensuring consistency as between different
parties instead of simply ensuring consistent treatment of a single party
being tried twice on the same charge. Consistency is a desired result of
our Constitution's due process and equal representation guarantees, 14" '
and a broader interpretation of virtual representation than that outlined
by the Court in Sturgell is required to preserve this value. Consistency
should therefore be given the weight that it deserves, even when one is
faced with the countervailing values of due process:
The consistency principle is closely related to the rule of law, which
recognizes that each citizen has a legitimate expectation that the
actions of public officials will be consistent with controlling law. The
consistency principle makes its strongest claim when it coincides
with established legal norms, such as the rule of law, the guarantees
of equal protection and due process, and the law of contracts. Its
136. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1034
(2003) (The goal of preclusion doctrines such as virtual representation is "to promote judicial
economy, avoid the disrepute to the system that arises from inconsistent results, and lay issues to
rest so that people can order their affairs.").
137. Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
138. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
139. Levinson, supra note 134, at 558-559 ("In the interests of enforcing consistent standards
for the conduct of law enforcement officers, our system accepts the risk that two equally culpable
suspects will receive inconsistent treatment-conviction for one, acquittal for the other.").
140. Id. at 553.
141. Id.
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weakest claim involves situations where inconsistency is built into
our system of government. 142
Of course, it is impossible to remove all inconsistency from our legal
system. Jury trials all but guarantee that there will be always be a level
of inconsistency since different juries can come out differently on fact
patterns that are essentially the same.'4 3 Nevertheless, our legal system
still views consistency as "a goal to be sought,"' 44 one that should have
at least been weighed against countervailing values when the Supreme
Court decided to narrow the scope of the virtual representation doctrine.
A third value that is lost because of Sturgell's narrow reading of the
virtual representation doctrine is finality. Our legal system recognizes
the importance of a final judgment actually being final. A judgment is
meant to be the law's last word in a judicial controversy. 45 "The preclu-
sion approach curtails collateral attack in order to produce a final judg-
ment that is, indeed, final. As a result, the approach furthers repose [and]
guards against inconsistent outcomes .... ."" Indeed, one may argue
that finality is the very purpose for litigating a case; parties who choose
to engage in a lawsuit want their problems to be permanently settled one
way or another. 47 The concept of finality is incorporated into our sys-
tem through the use of final judgments. Final judgments serve as a bar to
a subsequent action by the same parties on the same issue, and these
judgment are conclusive both to issues that were actually decided in a
case and to those issues that could have been, but were not, raised.1 48
Preclusion doctrines such as "artful pleading" also make sure that final
judgments at the federal level preclude the filing of cases at the state
level, giving federal judgments a greater sense of finality by prohibiting
a final judgment issued at the federal level from being challenged at the
state level, 14 9 which effectively removes at least one avenue whereby a
party familiar with the procedural rules of our legal system could cir-
cumvent the finality of final judgments. This concept of finality is also
embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which requires that
motions seeking relief from a final judgment be made no more than a
year after the entry of the final judgment. 50 By limiting the time that
142. Id. at 551.
143. Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Juryroom and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHi. L. Rav. 433 (1998).
144. Levinson, supra note 134, at 560.
145. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1 (2008).
146. Rubenstein, supra note 132, at 830.
147. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); see also S. Pac.
R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
148. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms Inc., 713 U.S. 1272, 1277 (1983).
149. Ultramar American Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990).
150. FED. R. Crv. P. 60.
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one has to challenge a judgment to one year, our legal system is increas-
ing the finality of a final judgment by ensuring that all final judgments
that were decided on the merits are final, whether right or wrong, if not
timely challenged. 5 ' In short, our system strives to certify final judg-
ments against future challenge while maintaining avenues of appeal,
allowing our system to correct its mistakes. While at first glance, finality
might seem less of a concern than upholding due process rights, our
legal system has often viewed this issue differently. Finality "has a busi-
ness-like quality to it that may seem insubstantial when juxtaposed with
the constitutional rights simultaneously at issue; yet the state's interest
in repose in civil matters regularly outweighs individual interests in all
sorts of situations. Indeed, finality typically trumps accuracy."' 52 The
need for finality is especially salient in a crowded legal system such as
ours. As Judge Cardozo observed: "The labor of judges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him."' 53 In order to have any credibility, our legal system
must guarantee the finality of judgments, and a broad reading of the
virtual representation doctrine is a way to increase finality. The virtual
representation doctrine helps preserve the finality of judgments by stop-
ping similar parties from bringing separate actions that litigate the same
issue. Take, for example, the class-action doctrine and its effect on final-
ity. First, assume that a class-action lawsuit is brought by victims of a
bus crash. The victims who were part of the legal class go to trial and
fail to obtain a judgment in their favor. At this point, those who chose
not to file are precluded from suing on the same issue. In this way,
courts' judgments on a particular issue or claim are insulated from fur-
ther challenge and are perceived as more legitimate because there is no
longer the risk that there will be a subsequent judgment on the same
issue that leads to a different result.' 54 A broader interpretation of the
virtual representation doctrine, one which applies to parties who have
informal relationships that do not rise to the level of the legal relation-
ships required by Sturgell, will guarantee that judgments in our legal
system will have a higher level of finality because more cases that could
potentially deliver future contrary judgments would be precluded.
151. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
152. Rubenstein, supra note 132, at 831.
153. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JurIciAL PROCESS 149 (Dover Publ'ns 2005)
(1921).
154. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SuP.
CT. REv. 337, 361.
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B. The Bright Line Test Adopted by the Sturgell Court for
Determining Virtual Representation is Less Efficient Than a
Totality of the Circumstances Test
The Supreme Court in Sturgell chose to replace the totality of the
circumstances approach applied by the D.C. Circuit with a bright-line
rule. Despite the Supreme Court's claim that a balancing approach
would "create more headaches than it relieves,"' 55 a totality of the cir-
cumstances test such as the one proposed by the D.C. Circuit would be
more appropriate than a bright-line-rule approach. Because the virtual
representation doctrine is not a well-established legal principle, a balanc-
ing test would allow courts to weigh and balance the competing interests
of both a narrow and a broad interpretation of the virtual representation
test in an effort to come up with an effective middle ground. There is
certainly a formalist argument to be made for the bright-line approach: a
bright-line test is more effective than a totality of the circumstances test
because bright-line rules give a greater appearance of equal treatment,
yield more consistent results when applied by different courts, and
arguably lead to more predictable outcomes over time.' 56 However, it is
equally well understood that there is necessity for moldable standards in
our legal system in order to give courts discretion, when appropriate; the
decision whether to apply bright-line rules over flexible standards
depends very much on the legal principle being scrutinized. 157 Even the
most ardent formalists acknowledge that an effective bright-line test can
only be formulated when one has a clear understanding of the legal prin-
ciple underlying that rule. 58 Unless a legal principle is understood per-
fectly, at least some judicial discretion will be required in order to
properly interpret that principle. "The advantages of the discretion-con-
ferring approach are obvious. All generalizations... are to some degree
invalid, and hence every rule of law has a few corners that do not quite
fit. It follows that perfect justice can only be achieved if courts are
155. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008).
156. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CFH. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79
(1989).
157. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 41-42
(2004):
A law of standards-with few narrow opinions-leaves room in which judges at all
levels retain considerable space in which to maneuver. One could consider this
space a vacuum, an area of lawlessness, or merely a set of gaps bounded by the
fabric of the law, when a judge must figure out how to decide a case not bounded by
an existing decision. For the most part, the rule of law and the popular desire for
limits on an unelected, undemocratic judiciary, requires that judicial actors in this
"lawless" territory act with restraint-aware of their legal surroundings and the
landmarks of judicial decisions in order to properly navigate the legal landscape.
158. Scalia, supra note 156, at 1183-84.
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unconstrained by such imperfect generalizations."' 59 The formalist argu-
ment that rules provide greater consistency through clear application is
also limited by the power of judicial review, which ensures that even the
clearest rules have the potential to be overruled at any point. 6 ° Judicial
review effectively removes the guarantee of consistency that bright line
rules seem to provide. In fact, a bright-line rule is actually more likely to
be replaced than a totality of the circumstances test because a totality of
the circumstances test can have elements added and reinterpreted. 6' In
contrast, a bright-line test is more likely to be overruled because of its
rigid, all or nothing approach.' 62 A totality of the circumstances
approach is therefore more effective than a bright-line-rule test when
dealing with a legal issue that does not present a widely acceptable solu-
tion or where interest analysis seems inevitable. 63 The history of the
virtual representation doctrine reveals that it is not a well-understood
legal doctrine. '" Therefore, in the virtual representation context, a total-
ity of the circumstances test would be more appropriate than a bright-
line rule. Given the uncertain history of the virtual representation doc-
trine, a totality of the circumstances test would allow courts to gauge, on
a case by case basis, whether the practical interests which the virtual
representation doctrine is meant to further outweigh the due process con-
cerns central to our legal system. Courts can tinker with the line that
they draw between due process and the practical benefits of efficiency,
consistency, and finality. That balance can be redefined as our legal sys-
tem changes over time. A bright-line rule threatens to take this ability to
adjust the balance between due process and practical application out of
the courts' hands.165 Similarly, a bright-line rule oversimplifies the prob-
159. Id. at 1177.
160. James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test
Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 834 (1995).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Michael Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice
and the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 INT'L J. OF CONST. L. 618, 639 (2006):
Indeed, when a formal legal (that is, constitutional) norm is well established and
widely accepted, it is likely to be perceived as rising above interests. Under such
circumstances, adherence to formalism is apt to be more authoritative and
persuasive than engaging in policy analysis. Conversely, when no widely acceptable
formal solution is at hand, interest analysis seems inevitable. In the latter case,
finding the best interests, the ones prompted by the largest majorities, and weighing
and balancing competing interests to reach the most productive and least restrictive
accommodation of interests seem to provide the best means of reconciling unity and
diversity.
164. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4457 (4th ed. 2009)
("The uncertain state of virtual-representation preclusion is illustrated by the juxtaposition of these
enthusiastic expansions with the more restrained approaches described earlier").
165. Id.:
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lem of how to apply virtual representation by ultimately deciding to
completely ignore the advantages that a judicious application of the doc-
trine would provide.
V. TOWARD A PRACTICAL SOLUTION
Looking at the legal history of the virtual representation doctrine
and the numerous interpretations and reinterpretations that the doctrine
has undergone, a common theme emerges. The conflict over how to
define virtual representation has always been one of judicial efficiency
and finality versus protection of individual rights and due process. 166
Consequently, the justification for having the virtual representation doc-
trine disappears completely when the doctrine ceases to serve the goals
of efficiency, consistency, and finality. 67 At such a point, due process
concerns would clearly swallow up the doctrine altogether. Therefore,
the best legal test for applying the virtual representation doctrine would
require a balancing test that ensures the doctrine will be applied only
when its practical advantages outweigh courts' due process concerns.
The difficulty in creating such a test lies in determining what factual
findings a court must make about the relationship between the current
litigating party and a party to a prior litigation before a court would be
justified in weighing the virtual representation doctrine's practical
advantages over the current party's due process interests, thus justifying
preclusion of the current party's case under the doctrine. While the
Sturgell Court has determined that practical advantages only outweigh
due process concerns when there is a preexisting legal relationship, I
would argue that this is a simplistic view, especially given the historic
ambiguity in formulating a workable test for the virtual representation
doctrine.16 8 A totality of the circumstances test would therefore be the
better test for determining when to apply the virtual representation doc-
trine. One alternative I would suggest is a three-pronged balancing test.
Under the first prong, a court's initial task would be to consider whether
the efficiency goals of the doctrine would be furthered through its appli-
Although it seems disturbing to employ discretion in identifying the parties bound
by a judgment, many of the other theories examined in these pages embody
important areas of discretion as well. The alternative to a vague discretionary
theory, moreover, may prove to be a general theory that goes too far. For the
present, at least, the best course lies in slow evolution of the new growth.
166. The history of the virtual representation doctrine is one of constant reinterpretation, see
supra pp. 6-19.
167. The Sturgell Court does makes a valid point in noting that a balancing approach with
multiple factors may lead to "expensive discovery tracking factors potentially relevant under
seven-or five-prong tests." Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008). Such a result
would clearly undermine the very justification for the virtual representation doctrine.
168. See supra note 110.
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cation to the case at hand. To make this determination, the court should
ask whether (1) the discovery requirements of addressing a virtual repre-
sentation issue are so substantial as to overshadow the main issue of the
case in question and (2) whether a failure to apply virtual representation
would lead to substantially more claims being filed by related parties on
the same issue. The second prong of the test would address consistency
by looking at whether litigation of these claims could lead to potentially
different results on the same issue (e.g. is the issue close enough that
two juries could come to two different verdicts in cases based on the
same claim and relying on substantially the same evidence?). If a court
determines that, under these prongs, the costs of implementing the vir-
tual representation doctrine outweigh the benefits, they should immedi-
ately reject applying a virtual representation analysis. Otherwise, courts
should proceed to the test's third prong, which would ask a court to look
at (1) whether a nonparty's interests were aligned with the interests of a
party in a prior suit and (2) whether the nonparty was adequately repre-
sented by the party in a prior suit. The determination of adequacy of
representation should be based on a totality of the circumstances analy-
sis taking into account (a) whether there is a close relationship between
the party and nonparty; (b) whether the nonparty actively participated in
the party's litigation; and (c) whether the party deliberately maneuvered
to avoid the effects of a prior action by acting through a nonparty. While
this test is certainly more complicated than the one posited by the
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell, it has the advantage of being more
flexible.
The first prong of the test is designed to eliminate the possibility of
employing the virtual representation doctrine when it becomes clear at a
case's inception that virtual representation's practical advantages will be
offset by situational realities such as a long discovery process or the fact
that there is little risk of different results in nonprecluded cases, elimi-
nating any threats to the values of finality and consistency. This concern
was raised in the Supreme Court's Sturgell opinion, and was one of the
factors that led the court to reject an expansive interpretation of the doc-
trine. 169 The first prong of the virtual representation test would address
this issue, as well as other more generalized efficiency concerns, by
applying the virtual representation doctrine only when preclusion would
ensure a real economic gain for the judicial system. The test would first
take into account the cost of the additional judicial proceedings neces-
169. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. at 2176 ("[A] diffuse balancing approach to nonparty preclusion
would likely create more headaches than it relieves . . . . An all-things-considered balancing
approach might spark wide-ranging, time-consuming, and expensive discovery tracking factors
potentially relevant under seven-or five-prong tests.").
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sary to determine whether claims preclusion is proper. If the costs of
those judicial proceedings outweigh the costs of deciding the case on the
merits, then preclusion would not make economic sense and should not
be applied unless the court, under part two of the first prong, believes
that allowing the present claim to go forward would open the door to a
substantial number of new claims being filed by new parties on the same
issue. Together, the two requirements of the first prong encourage courts
to consider the economic value that preclusion of a claim may have.
Economic value is addressed in the first prong because it is the weakest
of the values opposing due process, 170 and also the most pragmatic. If it
becomes immediately evident that not even efficiency concerns will be
satisfied by applying claims preclusion, then the analysis should stop
there. If a court determines preclusion satisfies efficiency concerns, it
should continue to the second prong.
The second prong of the test is designed to address the issues of
judicial consistency and finality. In looking at the possibility of whether
different outcomes may result in two cases based on the same claim, as
well as whether there is a substantial risk of appeal or future filings if the
case goes forward, courts would be upholding the values of consistency
and finality, values which are of primary interest in our legal system. 171
Because efficiency concerns alone are not enough of a reason to remove
due process protection, this prong encourages courts to establish that
there is enough of a countervailing interest in applying the virtual repre-
sentation doctrine before they begin the more serious task of determin-
ing whether the interests of a party have been adequately represented so
as to preclude that party's case.
The third prong of the test is meant to guarantee that, when applica-
tion of virtual representation is warranted, a court's decision to apply
virtual representation is based on facts indicating that the current party
had knowledge of the prior suit and was adequately represented in that
suit. Though analysis under this test would admittedly lead to a broader
application of virtual representation than the Sturgell Court's test, the
doctrine's application would be less arbitrary. Courts' determinations
would be based on facts specific to each case, rather than by rigid,
predefined categories. This is more consistent with the modem approach
courts have taken in looking at case-specific facts and circumstances to
determine if there is a due process interest to be protected 7 and, if so,
170. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 583 (1974) (holding that economic efficiency
alone is not enough of an interest to supersede Due Process).
171. This paper discusses the issues of finality and consistency and their value to our legal
system at supra pp. 35-43.
172. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (concluding that welfare recipients' interests in
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what due process should be provided.'73 The Sturgell decision strays
from this modem approach to due process by eschewing any type of
substantive analysis before it deprives a potential plaintiff of due pro-
cess. A substantive three-pronged approach would be more effective in
weeding out parties that have already been adequately represented and
are trying to take advantage of our procedural system from parties who
have a valid interest in having their case heard under the Due Process
Clause. Conversely, the Sturgell test, while easier to apply, is based on
predefined categories and therefore lacks the flexibility of a totality of
the circumstances test, thereby running the risk of depriving citizens
who fall into its predefined categories of legal relationships of their due
process without giving their specific circumstances any consideration.
Finally, it should be noted that this test does not address the
Sturgell Court's concern that a virtual representation test should be
based on strict rules so as to provide lower courts with firm guidance on
the doctrine's application.1 74 However, an approach that favors strict per
se rules in favor of a factual analysis would be inappropriate in the con-
text of the virtual representation doctrine given the ambiguous treatment
that the doctrine has received throughout its history. Where a legal prin-
ciple has not had a consistently clear historic definition, a test based on
flexible analysis is more appropriate because it allows courts to adjust
and redefine the parameters of that ambiguous legal principle over
time.1 75 Because virtual representation is just such an ambiguous legal
principle, a test determining when virtual representation applies should
abandon the Sturgell Court's adherence to strict rules and instead adopt
a more flexible approach based on totality of the circumstances analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due process has been recognized as a core value of our legal sys-
tem since its inception.'7 6 Our system strives to provide due process to
all those who participate, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. The day-
in-court ideal has been recognized as an extension of due process, and is
receiving payments outweigh those of the government in cutting Due Process short, thereby
extending Due Process protection to the welfare recipients).
173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing a substantive three prong test for
determining when process is due. This test requires courts to look at personal interests of the
plaintiff, risk of erroneous deprivation, and countervailing interests of the government before the
court can render a decision as to what process is due).
174. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (The Court says that a totality of the circumstances or
standards approach would provide less firm guidance to lower courts applying virtual
representation than would "crisp rules with sharp comers.").
175. See supra text accompanying notes 157-164.
176. Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of Legislative Exclusion,
55 EMORY L.J. 1, 53-54 (2006).
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a noble goal that our system should certainly try to achieve. The virtual
representation doctrine seems to stand firmly in the way of this goal: by
its very operation, the doctrine strives to preclude cases that would oth-
erwise have been heard. At first glance, it would therefore seem
favorable to follow the Supreme Court's initiative in Taylor v. Sturgell
and adopt as narrow a reading as possible of virtual representation in
order to preserve the day-in-court ideal. However, this simplistic view
fails to account for the countervailing values of efficiency, consistency,
and finality that a broad reading of the virtual representation doctrine
provides. Perhaps more importantly, a narrow reading of the virtual rep-
resentation doctrine also fails to account for the practical reality of our
modem legal system. Because our legal system hears fewer cases than
are filed every day, there is a virtually limitless backlog of cases which
courts must hear. In light of this fact, there will always be people who do
not get their day in court, whether because of preclusion or delay. A
doctrine such as virtual representation is needed to determine whether a
case should be precluded so that a more contested case may be heard in
its stead. Perhaps Professor Owen Fiss's pragmatic view on interest rep-
resentation in general should be applied to virtual representation specifi-
cally: "We [must] embrace interest representation but at the same time
appreciate its inherent dangers and anomalous character." '177 The virtual
representation doctrine raises a key constitutional issue, and any court
would clearly feel uncomfortable holding that due process takes a back-
seat to practical values of efficiency or economy. Nevertheless, the case
for virtual representation is stronger than the Supreme Court may want
to acknowledge. The values of due process do not operate in a vacuum;
they operate within the confines of a very active and, some might say,
even overlitigious society. When the virtual representation doctrine is
analyzed in this context, weighing due process against the countervailing
values of efficiency, consistency, and finality becomes a much more try-
ing task. By adopting a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court has failed to
wholeheartedly engage in this task. Instead, it has provided a quick fix
that favors uniform applicability over substantive differentiation.
Sturgell essentially creates a clear rule for a doctrine that courts have
consistently failed to clearly define. In doing so it has missed its chance
to lend some clarity to the doctrine's aura of confusion.
177. Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1452 (2003).
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